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Abstract: Security controls are certainly one of the most preferred ways of controlling the environment in which our system is 
“alive”. But although they are heavily represented and used in practice, security controls tend to become the same and not change 
after they are introduced. To try to make the most of the opportunities that this approach provides, this paper will explain the 
importance of implementing ICT security controls and propose a new approach by adding emergency ICT control. This approach 
gives us the ability to integrate the entire organization into the development of control by providing a better, more accurate and 
faster basis for managing the security risks of ICT technology.
Keywords: ICT – Information and communications technology, Risk, Security controls.
INTRODUCTION  
Business processes in the modern age depend 
largely on the degree of development of computer 
systems. The integration of sophisticated software 
solutions, the transfer of business data through 
computer networks and the creation of a cyber 
environment have proven to be very useful in the 
business world. But if we look at the other side, it 
is sure that the risk of data alienation is getting big-
ger and bigger. Cybercrime is a problem of a mod-
ern age that is causing headaches to companies 
around the world.
Like all other branches of business, an acceler-
ated process of computerization through business 
processes did not pass by ICT. ICT resource manage-
ment and in time reaction are key to the success and 
preservation of the process.
However, in order for the reaction to be timely, it 
is necessary to take steps that not only give prom-
ises but also results.
Risk Assessment and Systems
Risk is a product of a probability of an event and 
an impact on the event. With regard to the security 
risk of information systems, we can conclude that 
this risk deϐinition is difϐicult to apply directly be-
cause of the intentional impact on the event and the 
unpredictability of threats, and is often approximate 
to the relative risk of comparing the likelihood of a 
security attack successfully executed against an as-
set on another asset. It follows that security risk is a 
combination of threats, possible system vulnerabili-
ties to the threat, and consequences after a success-
ful attack. Thus, the threat is generally accepted as 
part of the assessment associated with determining 
further probabilities.
Information Attack Method
The method of information attack is a method 
that is deliberately directed, causing a damaging 
impact on the conϐidentiality, integrity and/or avail-
ability of information assets. Security data deals 
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with the protection of its conϐidentiality, integrity, 
and availability. Informational Attack Method treats 
the following elements:
• Conϐidentiality is important for information 
that is sensitive to reputation, competitive 
advantage, or security. Theft or copying may 
compromise the conϐidentiality of the data.
• Data integrity refers to their accuracy. Infor-
mation is useful if one can believe it is true. 
Without this element, the value of informa-
tion is drastically reduced.
• The availability of information is taken care of 
by delivering the data to the correct destina-
tion in a timely manner. If information reach-
es your destination late, it will be considered 
that it was not available when needed.
• Authentication means that the information is 
true and original (the information is neither 
fabrication nor copy) - it should be borne in 
mind that falsiϐication can also be done with-
out the principle of breach of conϐidentiality 
(counterfeit uses own account), possession of 
information (some data is taken out of con-
trol) or integrity (information is a product of 
criminogenic activity). Hence, information as-
sets are subject to threats of conϐidentiality, 
integrity, availability, and authenticity. The ex-
act nature or causes of this threat will depend 
on a particular property issue.
Methods of an attack on information assets can 
be done physically (by stealing or property dam-
age), by cyber-attacks, or by using electromagnetic 
spectrum interference suppression devices. For ex-
ample, a physical attack method claims a copy of the 
information may be stolen or copied without per-
mission and may potentially affect their conϐidenti-
ality. 
Similar information jeopardizes integrity, an at-
tack of dissatisϐied or forcible employees, deliber-
ately or virtually exchanged through a computer 
virus.
ISO 27005 Information security risk manage-
ment provides speciϐic guidance on the risk man-
agement of information protection within the orga-
nization.
To begin with, it is most important to determine 
critical points that are potentially at risk of attack. It 
is also important to emphasize that poor asset man-
agement, using obsolete software and hardware, 
lack of device compatibility, lack of alternative solu-
tions, and lack of adequate human factors are a very 
important component in risk assessment.
The classic threat model is a very good commu-
nication tool. The threat to the organization or sys-
tem is visible when it is displayed in a clear, easy to 
understand, and graphical representation. The mul-
tifaceted, hierarchical development of the Model of 
threats allows those with no technical or non-secu-
rity expertise to immediately assess where threats 
come from and identify which assets are attacked, 
and experts and operators point to the need for ad-
equate security control. The graphic nature of the 
model facilitates its understanding and increases its 
communication advantages. Furthermore, this mod-
el offers common deϐinitions and language for secu-
rity threats, inϐluences and controls to enable com-
munication. The threat model allows you to identify 
property threats that could cause a major impact on 
process activities. It, therefore, enables the risk as-
sessment organization to focus and resources on the 
asset that requires further testing.
Obviously, some security threats can and do a 
prolonged or delayed impact, and would be useful if 
this could be proven. The performance display pro-
cedure over a given period of time should be incor-
porated into the risk assessment methodology itself. 
This gives you additional beneϐit not only that you 
are able to communicate about the inϐluence of time 
aspect, but also encourages contemplation of coun-
termeasures that are time-constrained.
MEANS OF THREATS / SOURCES OF THREATS
Traditional sources of threats
Traditional threats in the narrow sense include 
espionage, sabotage, terrorism and subversion, and 
the deϐinitions that can be found below brieϐly de-
scribe each of these threats:
• Espionage - Espionage is an act in which cer-
tain foreign accesses or takes information se-
cretly or illegally through foreign forces, and 
for further goals has a subversive political 
goal.
• Sabotage - Sabotage is an unauthorized act 
where a certain party intentionally causes 
consequences that would slow down or stop 
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processes in the injured party in order to as-
sist certain hostile groups or to further pursue 
the political goal.
• Terrorism - Terrorism is an act by which a cer-
tain party through the use of violence or in-
timidation for the outcome has a political goal.
• Subversion - activities that endanger the secu-
rity or well-being of the State and are intend-
ed to undermine or abolish political ideology 
by industrial, political or violent means.
Non-traditional sources of threats
The number of non-traditional threats is on the 
rise and there are the following examples:
• Crime - Theft is a worrying rise especially 
for ICT and facilities with large budgets that 
are at risk of fraud of dissatisϐied workers or 
criminal groups. Criminal activity may range 
from physical theft of equipment, computers, 
computer parts, back-up materials, etc. This 
activity also includes blackmail, illegal access, 
or corruption of IT data for fraud or crime 
purposes.
• Protesting Groups - Protest groups are con-
ducting demonstrations, due to various 
causes, against a wide spectrum of facilities 
whether they are state or airport facilities and 
systems. They are mostly peaceful and demo-
cratic protests, but extreme elements can in-
volve the pursuit of attacks against individu-
als or property and can pose a threat and be 
as signiϐicant as part of terrorism.
• Research journalists - Research journalists 
can try to get information on certain works, 
critical information, program data, and even 
the structure of the whole system for better 
research. Such a type of non-traditional threat 
can lead to disturbances in daily operations, 
such as airport operations, and can seriously 
affect the company’s reputation.
• Industrial espionage - Industrial espionage is 
a type of unlawful act which through the ap-
propriation of information secretly or illegally 
works to help the competition.
ICT SECURITY CONTROLS
In order to adapt to the Security System, security 
controls should be grouped into six levels as shown 
in Figure 1 – ICT security control levels. The key dif-
ference is at the risk level of a particular ICT system 
depending on each organization. The level of risk 
varies depending on the criticality of the service 
provided by these vulnerabilities of the ICT system 
and the nature of threats depending on the systems.
ICT security control can be organized at levels 
depending on the assessment of ICT system vulner-
ability. The lowest level of risk will require the low-
est level of basic control; the highest level of risk will 
require the highest level of basic control.
International practice is the establishment of six 
levels of control: Level 1 to Level 6 are cumulative 
and meet the basic requirements of ICT control for 
organization. The degree of control depends on the 
complexity of the ICT system or the level of assess-
ment of the vulnerability of ICT assets. For example, 
Level 1 is the lowest level of security and is appro-
priate for organizations with a limited and isolated 
ICT system. Level 6 is the highest level, requiring the 
implementation of all control requirements (from 
Level 1 to Level 6). The key difference is at the risk 
level of a particular ICT system. The level of risk var-
ies depending on the criticality of the service pro-
vided by the organization, the vulnerability of the 
ICT system and the nature of threats.
It is necessary to create categories - tables for 
certain organizational functions and in detail to 
clarify each level. Since this kind of organization can 
not be categorized as a classical one, it is necessary 
for each and every individual before setting up con-
trol to determine critical assets depending on the 
organization’s business processes. This means that 
the ICT assets that are not critical to the operation 
will fall into lower risk, while critical assets will be 
included in the highest level of risk and therefore 
control. Within each table, levels of control in the 
rising order from levels 1 to level 6 are described. 
Levels are cumulative, which means that a higher 
level of control contains all that is listed below.
Control levels are designed so that the organiza-
tion is balanced Certainty will have similar levels of 
control in each of the organizational functions. The 
organization may request the revision of ICT secu-
rity, assessing the level of control for each of the 
above-mentioned categories. This assessment may 
point to areas where controls are inconsistent at 
their levels.
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It is important to know that multiple business-
critical networks and multiple non-critical networks 
can emerge at the organization level. This type of 
organization poses many different security require-
ments to us and it is very difϐicult to put everything 
in the same bin. Namely, it is a miracle to ϐind your-
self in a situation where all levels and all controls 
are applicable to all networks of the organization. To 
properly address this issue and set up valid security 
controls, you must do the following:
• Categorizing the importance of networks and 
network infrastructure
• Categorizing the importance of data
• Determining the points of contact between 
critical and non-business networks
For each of the above requirements, it is neces-
sary to develop security controls that will be ade-
quate for each individual network category. Partic-
ular attention should be paid to cases where these 
two types of differently categorized networks meet. 
In these cases, priority is given to controls over criti-
cal networks. Network staff categorized as critical 
to the network will always have “superiority” over 
staff working on a network of lesser importance to 
the organization. This is not to say that one network 
or staff is more dominant than another, but that in 
the event of a network crash, being categorized as 
critical would have a greater impact on the proϐit-
ability and reputation of the organization.
In order to meet the requirements of interna-
tional regulations, local Laws and provisions of in-
ternational standards, which are increasingly imple-
mented by organizations, it is necessary to develop 
a set of controls that will meet all of these require-
ments, and in addition, meet the needs of the orga-
nization and ensure conϐidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of data. All of these regulations, as well 
as international standards, give us requirements 
that must be met as well as guidelines for satisfy-
ing them. Although compliance with the provisions 
is considered to be a harmonized security system, in 
many cases there is a lack of security controls, which 
is visible only after conducting an audit, control or 
penetration test. In order for an organization to en-
sure that controls are fully aligned with operational 
requirements, it is necessary to enter into every 
message of the organization and examine the weak-
est links. From the human resources, the IT sector 
of the security staff, and even to the administrative 
staff itself, there is a certain degree of responsibility 
for conducting security controls.
The fact is that risk assessments cannot be ac-
curate unless there is accurate input from all stake-
holders, both inside and outside the organization. 
Given the importance of risk assessment, it is cru-
cial to ensure accurate and timely information. If 
Level Information Scope
Critical system 
isolation
Threats
1
Manage sensitive 
information
Critical Isolated Common threats (eg hacker attacks or potential criminals)
2
Manage sensitive 
information
All
Highly-connected IT 
system
Common threats (eg hacker attacks or potential criminals)
3
For sensitive 
information
Adds a medium level 
of control to the 
security system
Exposure to a larger 
area of threat is little 
compared to the overall 
ICT system within the 
organization
More modern and better equipped potential attackers (eg 
those dealing with serious and organized crime - cybercrime, 
including terrorist organizations)
4
For sensitive 
information
Medium level 
control for the entire 
organization
Highly Integrated 
Information System
More modern and better equipped potential attackers (eg 
those dealing with serious and organized crime - cybercrime, 
including terrorist organizations)
5
Information is of 
great value to the 
organization and 
potential attackers
High level of control is 
characteristic of risks 
and assets
Relatively isolated
The most powerful potential attackers. These types of attacks 
are in most cases associated with hostile governments (eg 
government-sponsored terrorism, industrial espionage or some 
highly capable offenders engaged by a criminal organization)
6
Information is of 
great value to the 
organization and 
potential attackers
High level of control 
for the entire 
organization
The distribution of 
assets can not be 
suffi ciently isolated
The most powerful potential attackers. These types of attacks 
are in most cases associated with hostile governments (eg 
government-sponsored terrorism, industrial espionage or some 
highly capable offenders engaged by a criminal organization)
Figure 1. ICT security control levels
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there is no quality input or it is learned during the 
risk assessment that a particular part of the orga-
nization has failed or is unable to provide accurate 
information, then that same part of the process can 
be viewed as a risk.
PROPOSAL FOR EMERGENCY SECURITY CONTROLS
It would be a good idea, when establishing secu-
rity controls, to establish a mechanism for adopting 
 emergency security controls that would serve as a 
coercive mechanism as well as a mechanism to pro-
tect certain organizational processes. In cases where 
certain organizational units are unable to carry out 
activities and thus place themselves in a situation 
of becoming a security vulnerability, this approach 
could provide additional security measures for a 
predetermined period of time. This type of control 
could be considered as the highest level and would 
only relate to processes that have proven to be vul-
nerable when assessing risk. Adopting emergency 
security controls would allow for faster response 
and would target a smaller target since they can 
only be adapted to one process as opposed to the 
previous approach in which controls are divided or-
ganizationally or by categorization of networks and 
processes.
We can also look at emergency security controls 
as a complement to process or system-dependent 
security controls. They could also be set up as a set 
of predeϐined controls that are only valid under cer-
tain conditions or within a speciϐied period of time. 
Although all this can be achieved by establishing a 
well-known control system, by making precise pro-
visions for each individual system or process, they 
would make such a large set of controls that, in the 
case of generalization, would be violated with itself. 
Therefore, we suggest that in addition to the already 
known system of security controls, it should be sup-
plemented with controls depending on the process 
and the system and with a deϐined time period or 
activity that activates them.
Application of emergency security con-
trols
We can see the application of this approach to 
security management during emergencies. In the 
event of an emergency, controls in the already pre-
pared set should come into effect and not used until 
then. For example, let us say that at level 6, human 
resources control does not, in normal situations, 
contain speciϐically deϐined provisions on the pro-
hibition of access to facilities with critical ICT sys-
tems. Should an emergency response event occur, an 
emergency plan should be in place. An Emergency 
Plan is a plan of measures that an organization must 
take to respond, reduce the consequences, or pre-
vent hacker attacks. This applies exclusively to the 
operational part and covers strictly prescribed ac-
tivities that must be fully complied with. But what 
about policies and security controls? They remain 
unchanged in this situation. Emergency controls 
should focus on access policies, ensure smooth op-
eration, but at the same time tighten employee ac-
cess.
During the period of validity of emergency secu-
rity controls, they should be revised and their appli-
cability checked in real-time. This approach would 
require a team of internal auditors to conduct an in-
ternal audit on the applicability of emergency provi-
sions at predetermined periods of time. The same 
could be done through checklists.
System Control via Check Lists
Checklists are a tool to quickly and easily deter-
mine whether work processes are in accordance 
with the requirements. By using this tool, the ex-
aminer can prove in a very short time whether the 
processes are running smoothly. Controlling the 
network’s operating system through a checklist re-
quires constant updating and alignment of checklist 
issues with security requirements. For example, in 
the case of a high-level security checklist, the check-
list should be ϐilled in as short a time interval as 
possible and the width of the questions should be 
as narrow as possible. This means that any question 
that is put in the checklist must be directly question-
free.
Good control and information gathering through 
checklists:
• The speed of collecting more information
• Possibility to set the pitch
• Possibility of changing issues with each inter-
nal control
• Broad-spectrum of interviewees (from tech-
nical to other staff)
• The ability to use data from checklists as a 
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data source to modify or supplement security 
controls
Poor control and information gathering via 
checklists:
• The accuracy of the information obtained
• Professional qualiϐications of respondents to 
answer questions of expert nature
• The accuracy of the data from the checklists 
as a data source for the risk assessment meth-
odology
• Disclosure of matter by the examiner (result-
ing in a bad question, which leaves the pos-
sibility for the wrong answer of the interview-
ee)
From the above, we can see that the checklists 
can be used to check in a very short time interval 
the possibility of implementing the set of ICT secu-
rity controls. Based on the checklist, it is possible to 
conclude that further adaptation of a certain level of 
security controls to the system is required.
Information systems audit
Audit of information systems represents the pro-
cess of checking the success of information systems 
in accordance with business requirements, ie the 
process of analysis and veriϐication of their accuracy, 
efϐiciency, efϐiciency, and reliability. It is a collection 
of complex management, auditing, and technology 
activities that examine (check) the effects, but also 
the risks of using information systems and ultimate-
ly evaluate their impact on business.
This is a complex process of collecting and evalu-
ating evidence that can be used to assess the success 
of a business information system, whether to deter-
mine whether a business information system is in 
the function of asset retention, whether data integ-
rity is maintained, whether it is effective to achieve 
business goals and use are the resources of the sys-
tem in an effective way.
An information system audit is a systematic pro-
cess for assessing whether IT complies with busi-
ness operations to what extent it effectively and ef-
fectively supports the business objectives and the 
practice (maturity) of management and control of 
information systems at various hierarchical levels.
The audit information system is systematically 
and thoroughly inspecting controls across all parts 
of the information system, and the basic task is to 
evaluate its current state (maturity, performance 
level), detect risk areas, assess the level of risk, and 
give recommendations to management to improve 
its management practices.
Combining all the steps from above and making 
them meet the requirements of a speciϐic organiza-
tion, we will make sure that our controls are put in 
such a manner that will be effective and in time. The 
only thing left to do is making sure that our person-
nel is appropriate for tasks they are assigned for.
CONCLUSION
Given that the use of security controls is governed 
by regulations and international standards, practice 
shows that the beneϐits they provide are very rarely 
fully utilized. The globalization of IT systems and 
the pursuit of business activities in the virtual world 
increases the risk of information alienation or at-
tack on systems. The use of security controls covers 
almost the entire organization and increases conϐi-
dence in the system. However, as with other branch-
es of the economy, the development of an IT system 
requires the development of a security system, and 
therefore a further modiϐication of security controls 
that must at all times justify its reason for being.
Introducing emergency security controls can 
contribute to improving the security system and im-
proving management’s handling of the security sys-
tem, which gives us an increased dose of conϐidence 
in an age when nobody is safe online.
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